From Trilemma Towards Tolerance: A Comprehensive Approach to Containing Unreasonableness in Political Liberalism

Abstract

John Rawls’ political theory has profoundly shaped the discourse in contemporary political philosophy. However, recognizing the recent shifts in political trends and increasing illiberal challenges to liberal democracy, I present in this thesis project a critical re-evaluation of Rawlsian political liberalism. I explore the rise of unreasonable political attitudes among citizens in liberal democracies, which poses a challenge to political liberalism. I survey existing responses within liberal political philosophy—conciliation, transformation, and marginalization—and highlight their limitations in addressing what I call ‘the trilemma of pluralism’: balancing the ideals of legitimacy, stability, and inclusivity given an enduring and significant presence of unreasonableness in liberal society. Building on this analysis, I propose a multifaceted and comprehensive strategy to contain the political influence of unreasonable doctrines and citizens while addressing the complexities of the trilemma. In particular, I will seek to advance the ongoing academic debate by emphasizing seven points specifically in this thesis project. Firstly, that the epistemic elements of reasonableness warrant the inclusion the additional basic aspect modeled of the ‘duty of prudence’. Secondly, that recent findings from moral psychological research imply that political liberalism should postulate simple pluralism instead of reasonable pluralism. Thirdly, that the challenges posed by rising unreasonableness are interconnected as modeled by the trilemma and should not be solved separately but in an integrated manner. Fourthly, that the current binary model of unreasonable citizens is too reductive and ought to be refined with four significant subcategories: ‘uncooperative,’ ‘unequitable,’ ‘anti-reasonable,’ and ‘unaware’ citizens. Fifthly, that an approach of involvement towards partially reasonable citizens can enhance the inclusivity of political liberalism. Sixthly, that wholly unreasonable citizens can be provided with an adequate reason to dismiss their challenges to the legitimacy of the liberal order. Finally, that a 'duty of vigilance' is essential for bolstering the stability of liberal democracy, encouraging heightened civic engagement and awareness. Despite the serious challenges facing liberal democracy, I ultimately conclude that Rawlsian principles can provide valuable and practicable insights, thus remaining relevant and adaptable to contemporary political issues.