Embracing compassion for a more practical moral framework for human-nature relationships

Abstract

Environmental ethics has devoted a lot of attention into fighting anthropocentrism, as well as criticizing the widespread modern view on nature based on a human-nature dualism. In this thesis, I will look into two, opposite environmental ethics frameworks in light of this dualism: extensionism and eco-phenomenology. I will argue that we are in need of a new paradigm for human-nature relationships based on the role of compassion. In chapter 1, I will look into three extensionist theories — sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism — and argue that they show forms of dualism and rely too much on rational moral commitments in our relationship with nature, while also placing a faulty focus on rejecting anthropocentrism. I will then, in chapter 2, look into a phenomenological critique on extensionism, centred around human emotions and embeddedness, focusing on the emotive response of compassion in our lived experiences with nature. I will argue that this account helps to solve human-nature dualism, as well as rightfully places a focus on anthropocentrism. Finally, in chapter 3, I will take into account the convincing aspects of the theoretical analyses of the first two chapters and defend a more practical framework that rests on the institutional work of expressing compassionate attitudes towards nature and helping individuals and collectives form an understanding of their place in the natural world.