Infinite Otherness and Ethical Expectations

Abstract

Departing from Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of the infinity of the Other, I study what we can ethically expect from one another. Generally, moral theories assume that the meaning of right and wrong behaviour is universal. This assumption stems from the premise that humans are fundamentally alike, meaning that what applies to me, also applies to other people. Emmanuel Levinas, however, introduces a different approach to understanding the Other, stating that they are radically other from the self. Just as infinity always exceeds our idea of infinity, the absolute otherness of the Other will always elude our understanding of them. Therefore, we cannot comprehend the Other in terms of sameness. In this thesis, I examine the implications of this view for reciprocity in ethical relations. Before analysing this question, I will explain why Levinas considers systems based on sameness to be totalising, followed by his reasoning for prioritising the Other over the self and what he means by the other’s absolute otherness. I then explore the implications of this otherness for Levinas’ perspective on ethics and what his ethical philosophy entails. Building on his principles and ethics, I will argue that acknowledging the alterity of the other means that we cannot ethically expect anything from them. Instead of a moral theory founded on reasonable principles, rules or ideal outcomes, ethics of alterity reflects the practical interrelations between people. I will close by stating that while we may not expect anything, we may hope.