Moral Status and Intellectual Disability A Defence for an Inclusive Account of Moral Status

Abstract

The following thesis discusses the current debate on the moral status of human beings. The aim of this thesis, is to defend an account of moral status that´s inclusive to severely intellectually disabled people. Contrary to thinkers who try to base moral status on the possession or lack of psychological attributes, I will argue that the unique form of dependency that´s inherent to human relationships, and the meaning we derive from this relationships should be central in assessing moral status. In light of these considerations, Nussbaum´s capability approach, and Rawls’ conception on moral powers will be examined. In doing so I will argue that there´s an understanding of human nature that´s inherent to their ideas. This understanding of humans - as independent autonomous beings - should be revised, if we are to create a society that´s inclusive to intellectually disabled people.