When Does Corruption Demobilize? The Conditional Effect of Individual Perception of Corruption on Voter Turnout

Abstract

Previous research found a demobilizing effect of corruption on voter turnout. I add to the current literature by exploring the effect of individual perception of corruption on voter turnout, and analyzing if this effect is weaker in high corruption countries. Using logistic regression analysis and the European Social Survey (ESS), Round 5 data (2010), I found support for a significant negative effect of individual perception of corruption on voter turnout. Moreover, I found evidence of a moderation effect of macro corruption level on the effect of individual perception of corruption on voter turnout. The retrospective voting model applies in countries with a low corruption level, while the resource model and RCT explain voter turnout in countries with a high corruption level. Citizens who perceive corruption as low and live in a low corruption country will be more inclined to vote than citizens who perceive corruption as low and live in a high corruption country, and citizens who perceive corruption as high and live in a low corruption country will be less inclined to vote than citizens who perceive corruption as high and live in a high corruption country.